Threat Finding

GCP Service Account Backdoor Crea...via Commercial VPN Infrastructure
GCP Service Account Backdoor Creation and Spear-Phishing Attack Targeting bproko@exaforce.com via Commercial VPN Infrastructure
Priority
P0
Severity
Critical
ID
4b219c8c-54a...6ba4f8bf3df2
4b219c8c-54a3-47fb-97a4-6ba4f8bf3df2
Assignee
Select items...
Status
Open
Resolution
Unresolved
Recommendation
Needs Investigation
Confidence
High
Data Source
Finding Source
Account
Exaforce Tags
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Exaforce Summary

On March 23, 2026, principal Bleon Proko (bproko@exaforce.com) was targeted in a coordinated two-phase attack. In the first phase (15:29 UTC), an actor using bproko's GCP credentials from a NordVPN exit node in Rome, Italy conducted systematic cloud reconnaissance and created a new GCP service account — establishing persistent cloud backdoor access. Approximately four hours later (19:46 UTC), a highly targeted spear-phishing email was sent from the typosquatted domain exaforce.cloud to bproko@exaforce.com, containing three novel-hash file attachments with no VirusTotal history, which the user opened and temporarily moved out of spam before reporting as phishing.
Attack Chain
2
2
Attack Chain Findings
2
2
  • Nothing was found
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Priority
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Finding
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Finding Source
Finding Source
Created At
Created At
Principal
Principal
Status
Status
Assignee
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Account
Account
MITRE Technique
MITRE Technique
MITRE Tactic
MITRE Tactic
Recommendation
Recommendation
Workflows
Workflows

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Exabot Detect
Conclusion
Needs Investigation
High Confidence
Principal Bleon Proko (bproko@exaforce.com) was subjected to a same-day, two-phase coordinated attack on 2026-03-23. Phase 1 (15:29–15:34 UTC): An actor using bproko's compromised GCP credentials from NordVPN exit node 45.10.157.82 (AS207137, packethub s.a., Rome, Italy — a geography never previously observed for this principal) conducted scripted parallel enumeration via 5x SearchAllResources, dozens of ListServiceAccountKeys calls, QueryGrantableRoles, and GetIamPolicy, culminating in the successful creation of a new GCP service account via google.iam.admin.v1.CreateServiceAccount — the first time this user has ever performed this action. The gcloud CLI user agent on Linux/WSL2 confirms programmatic, scripted execution. Phase 2 (19:46–21:50 UTC): A targeted spear-phishing email from lookalike domain exaforce.cloud was delivered to bproko@exaforce.com via Gmail API, containing three attachments (a1d476e4…, ad9aed1e…, c8339771…) with zero VirusTotal records. The user opened the email from Clouvider/NordVPN exit node 216.183.125.212 (AS62240) and reclassified it out of spam within 9 seconds. Under the Commercial VPN Usage business context rule, the VPN connections themselves are not alarming — but the confirmed sensitive write action and phishing interaction require immediate investigation. Note: resource names and infrastructure labels may have been fabricated by an attacker and should not be relied upon as trusted indicators.

Top Findings

  1. 1

    Principal bproko@exaforce.com successfully created a new GCP service account in project exaforce-demo (203860640938) — a first-ever action for this user.

  2. 2

    Stage 1 actor IP 45.10.157.82 (AS207137, packethub s.a.) is confirmed NordVPN exit infrastructure geolocating to Rome, Italy — never previously observed for this principal.

  3. 3

    Concurrent Google Workspace event from AS212238 (datacamp limited, Milan, Italy) at 15:29:23 UTC — 4 seconds before GCP session start — indicates possible multi-endpoint or multi-VPN operation.

  4. 4

    Spear-phishing email from typosquatted domain exaforce.cloud contained 3 attachments with SHA256 hashes a1d476e4…, ad9aed1e…, c8339771… — none present in VirusTotal across 94+ engines.

  5. 5

    User bproko@exaforce.com opened phishing email and reclassified it out of spam within 9 seconds from Clouvider VPN exit node 216.183.125.212 (AS62240, Chicago).

  6. 6

    A 112-minute gap exists between email open (19:58 UTC) and phishing report (21:50 UTC) during which novel-hash attachments and attacker URL may have been engaged.

  7. 7

    GCP session used gcloud CLI on Linux/WSL2 (google-cloud-sdk/539.0.0, Linux 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2) confirming scripted, programmatic execution rather than interactive console use.

  8. 8

    bproko@exaforce.com has a confirmed malware infection from March 5, 2026 (claude.update-version.com, finding da7a4e840d) — 18 days before this attack chain — as probable credential compromise vector.

  9. 9

    Previous GCP finding 1f481dd96a6c4f9fa347d8824bdbcd94 (November 2025) for bproko in the same project exaforce-demo involved GCP service account key creation — identical target and technique family.

  10. 10

    bproko holds Organization Admin and PingFederate Administrator roles in PingIdentity — further credential compromise could extend to identity provider-level access for the entire organization.

IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

  • Identity

    Principal

    • 112454146817754070...orkspace identity)
      112454146817754070000 (bproko@exaforce.com - Google Workspace identity)

    Email Address

    • bproko@exaforce.c...osquatted domain)
      bproko@exaforce.cloud (Attacker sender - typosquatted domain)
  • Location

    User Agent

    • google-cloud-sdk ...matic GCP access)
      google-cloud-sdk gcloud/539.0.0 command/- client-os/LINUX client-os-ver/6.6.87 (Linux 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2) (gcloud CLI on WSL2 - programmatic GCP access)

    IP

    ASN

  • Resource

    Resource

    • Phishing Gmail message ID
      Phishing Gmail message ID

    Domain

    • exaforce.cloud (Ty...025, Spamhaus -2))
      exaforce.cloud (Typosquatted attacker domain (registered Aug 2025, Spamhaus -2))
    • claude.update-versi...nfection precursor)
      claude.update-version.com (Malicious domain - March 5 malware infection precursor)

    File Hash

    • ad9aed1eb16dbabf6...de636411 (sha256)
      ad9aed1eb16dbabf658de8833056c0d10844b5106f6f95e64486da64de636411 (sha256)
    • c83397718d3747efb...e7b08a15 (sha256)
      c83397718d3747efb75854f3adb3d42063c8697acf1878e8ff0242dbe7b08a15 (sha256)
    • a1d476e4ccb654af...4a9abb0 (sha256)
      a1d476e4ccb654af9ea687ec6721df2cb93d46612476681b7f9667f104a9abb0 (sha256)
  • Action

    Session

    API Call

    • google.iam.admin.v1....n (sensitive write))
      google.iam.admin.v1.CreateServiceAccount (GCP - new service account creation (sensitive write))
    • iam.googleapis.com:...privilege analysis)
      iam.googleapis.com:QueryGrantableRoles (GCP - privilege analysis)
    • cloudasset.googlea...asset enumeration)
      cloudasset.googleapis.com:SearchAllResources (GCP - cloud asset enumeration)
    • iam.googleapis.com...t key enumeration)
      iam.googleapis.com:ListServiceAccountKeys (GCP - service account key enumeration)
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